토토사이트
Advertisement
  • 홈
    • 카지노사이트
    • 도박사이트
    • 룰렛 사이트
    • 라이브카지노
    • 바카라사이트
    • 안전카지노
  • 경제
  • 파이낸스
  • 정치
  • 투자
    • Invest in Amazon $250
  • 암호화폐
    • Best Bitcoin Accounts
    • Bitcoin Robot
      • Quantum AI
      • Bitcoin Era
      • Bitcoin Aussie System
      • Bitcoin Profit
      • Bitcoin Code
      • eKrona Cryptocurrency
      • Bitcoin Up
      • Bitcoin Prime
      • Yuan Pay Group
      • Immediate Profit
      • BitQH
      • Bitcoin Loophole
      • Crypto Boom
      • Bitcoin Treasure
      • Bitcoin Lucro
      • Bitcoin System
      • Oil Profit
      • The News Spy
      • Bitcoin Buyer
      • Bitcoin Inform
      • Immediate Edge
      • Bitcoin Evolution
      • Cryptohopper
      • Ethereum Trader
      • BitQL
      • Quantum Code
      • Bitcoin Revolution
      • British Trade Platform
      • British Bitcoin Profit
    • Bitcoin Reddit
    • Celebrities
      • Dr. Chris Brown Bitcoin
      • Teeka Tiwari Bitcoin
      • Russell Brand Bitcoin
      • Holly Willoughby Bitcoin
  • 온라인 카지노
    • 카지노에서 승리하는 방법
    • 카지노에서 블랙잭을 플레이하는 방법
    • 카지노에서 룰렛을 플레이하는 방법
    • 바카라 게임 방법
    • 카지노 카드 게임을 하는 방법
    • 온라인 카지노를 플레이하는 방법
    • 카지노에 무엇을 입어야합니까?
    • 카지노에서 크랩스를 플레이하는 방법
  • 스포츠 베팅
    • 야구에 베팅하는 방법
    • 축구에 베팅하는 방법
    • NFL 게임에 베팅하는 방법
    • 슬롯 머신에서 승리하는 방법
    • 스포츠 베팅은 어떻게 작동하나요?
  • 슬롯 머신
    • 가장 높은 지불금 슬롯 머신
    • 슬롯 토너먼트는 어떻게 진행되나요?
  • 온라인 베팅
    • 베팅 배당률은 어떻게 작동하나요?
    • 머니라인 베팅이 뭐야?
    • 슈퍼볼에 베팅하는 방법
    • 라운드 로빈 베팅은 어떻게 진행되나요?
    • UFC 경기에 베팅하는 방법
    • 매칭베팅이 뭐야?
    • 경마에 베팅하는 방법
    • 스프레드 베팅이란 무엇입니까?
No Result
View All Result
  • 홈
    • 카지노사이트
    • 도박사이트
    • 룰렛 사이트
    • 라이브카지노
    • 바카라사이트
    • 안전카지노
  • 경제
  • 파이낸스
  • 정치
  • 투자
    • Invest in Amazon $250
  • 암호화폐
    • Best Bitcoin Accounts
    • Bitcoin Robot
      • Quantum AI
      • Bitcoin Era
      • Bitcoin Aussie System
      • Bitcoin Profit
      • Bitcoin Code
      • eKrona Cryptocurrency
      • Bitcoin Up
      • Bitcoin Prime
      • Yuan Pay Group
      • Immediate Profit
      • BitQH
      • Bitcoin Loophole
      • Crypto Boom
      • Bitcoin Treasure
      • Bitcoin Lucro
      • Bitcoin System
      • Oil Profit
      • The News Spy
      • Bitcoin Buyer
      • Bitcoin Inform
      • Immediate Edge
      • Bitcoin Evolution
      • Cryptohopper
      • Ethereum Trader
      • BitQL
      • Quantum Code
      • Bitcoin Revolution
      • British Trade Platform
      • British Bitcoin Profit
    • Bitcoin Reddit
    • Celebrities
      • Dr. Chris Brown Bitcoin
      • Teeka Tiwari Bitcoin
      • Russell Brand Bitcoin
      • Holly Willoughby Bitcoin
  • 온라인 카지노
    • 카지노에서 승리하는 방법
    • 카지노에서 블랙잭을 플레이하는 방법
    • 카지노에서 룰렛을 플레이하는 방법
    • 바카라 게임 방법
    • 카지노 카드 게임을 하는 방법
    • 온라인 카지노를 플레이하는 방법
    • 카지노에 무엇을 입어야합니까?
    • 카지노에서 크랩스를 플레이하는 방법
  • 스포츠 베팅
    • 야구에 베팅하는 방법
    • 축구에 베팅하는 방법
    • NFL 게임에 베팅하는 방법
    • 슬롯 머신에서 승리하는 방법
    • 스포츠 베팅은 어떻게 작동하나요?
  • 슬롯 머신
    • 가장 높은 지불금 슬롯 머신
    • 슬롯 토너먼트는 어떻게 진행되나요?
  • 온라인 베팅
    • 베팅 배당률은 어떻게 작동하나요?
    • 머니라인 베팅이 뭐야?
    • 슈퍼볼에 베팅하는 방법
    • 라운드 로빈 베팅은 어떻게 진행되나요?
    • UFC 경기에 베팅하는 방법
    • 매칭베팅이 뭐야?
    • 경마에 베팅하는 방법
    • 스프레드 베팅이란 무엇입니까?
No Result
View All Result
토토사이트
No Result
View All Result

Crestmont Quarterly Review

admin by admin
10월 13, 2012
in 미분류
0
0
SHARES
14
VIEWS
Share on FacebookShare on Twitter

CURRENT STATUS (Third Quarter 2012)

by Ed Easterling, Crestmont Research

The stock market rallied over the past quarter, increasing P/E further into the range of “fairly-valued.” P/E has returned to the same level as the end of probable-outcomes-bookSMALLthe first quarter, which is the highest P/E since mid-2008. By historical standards, the higher levels of P/E in 2007 (~25x) were near the upper limit of “fairly-valued.” One implication could be that the current level of P/E has room to grow. Yet for investors that now foresee a greater risk of slower economic growth and/or a higher inflation rate or deflation in the future, the upper bound for P/E fair-value would be much lower than historically warranted. Further, note that the reported P/E increased this quarter not only due to the market rally, but also as a result of a decline in earnings. The reported P/E remains distorted below the normalized P/E due to currently high and unsustainable profit margins. The trend in earnings should be watched closely and investors should remain cognizant of the risks confronting an increasingly vulnerable market.

Click on table for larger image.

THE BIG PICTURE

The P/E ratio can be a good measure of the level of stock market valuation when properly calculated and used. In effect, P/E represents the number of years worth of earnings that investors are willing to pay for stocks. Although we will discuss later the business cycle and its periodic distortion of “reported” P/Es, most references to P/Es in this report will relate to the normalized P/E that has been adjusted for those periodic distortions.

Stocks are financial assets which provide a return through dividends and price appreciation. Both dividends and price appreciation are generally driven by increases in earnings. Despite the hope of some pundits, earnings tend to increase at a similar rate to economic growth over time.

Historically (and based upon well-accepted financial and economic principles), the valuation level of the stock market has cycled from levels below 10 times earnings to levels above 20 times earnings. Except for bubble periods, the P/E tends to peak near 25 (the fundamental limitations to P/E are discussed in chapter 8 of Unexpected Returns). Figure 1 presents the historical values for all three versions of the P/E discussed in this report.

Figure 1. P/E Ratio: 1900-3Q2012E (EPS estimate from S&P)

Click on graph for larger image.

What drives the P/E cycle? The answer is the inflation rate—the loss of purchasing power of money and capital. During periods of higher inflation, investors want a higher rate of return to compensate for inflation. To get a higher rate of return from stocks, investors pay a lower price for the future earnings (i.e. lower P/Es). Therefore, higher inflation leads to lower P/Es and declining inflation leads to higher P/Es.

The peak for P/E generally occurs at very low and stable rates of inflation. When inflation falls into deflation, earnings (the denominator for P/E) begins to decline on a reported basis (deflation is the nominal decline in prices). At that point, with future earnings expected to decline from deflation, the value of stocks declines in response to reduced future earnings—thus, P/Es also decline under deflation.


Secular market cycles are not driven by time, but rather they are dependent upon distance.


Therefore, for this discussion, assume that there are three basic scenarios for inflation: rising, low, and deflation. As discussed above, rising inflation or deflation causes the P/E ratio to decline over an extended period which in turn creates a secular bear market. From periods of higher inflation or deflation, the return of inflation to a lower level causes the P/E ratio to increase over an extended period thereby creating a secular bull market.

Secular bull markets can only occur when P/E ratios get low enough to then double or triple as inflation returns to a low level. As a result, secular market cycles are not driven by time, but rather they are dependent upon distance—as measured by the decline in P/E to a low enough level to then enable a significant increase.

CYCLICAL vs. SECULAR

The current P/E is 20.8—well above the historical market average and well into the range that would be expected in a low inflation environment (assuming historically-average economic growth). BUT, secular markets are driven by longer-term annual trends rather than momentary market disruptions.

The secular analysis for each year relates to the average index across the year; so for each year, the price (P) in P/E (price/earnings ratio) is the average index for all days of the year. The stock market has recovered most of its declines from late 2008 and early 2009; therefore, it’s now fairly clear that the period in late 2008 and early 2009 was just a cyclical (short-term) bear market blip within a longer secular bear market. Of course, that makes the last four years a typical cyclical bull market inside a secular bear market (it has happened many times before).

If the stock market does not recover further or cannot sustain the recovery gains from the past four years due to significant inflation or deflation, the normalized P/E over the next few years will likely decline below the historical average and the foundation for a secular bull market would begin to be laid.

We’re in a period with many daily (often hourly) points that represent pixels in the market’s picture. The short-run trends (the cyclical cycles) of the market are hard to predict. Without extraordinary powers of clairvoyance, the best plan is a diversified, non-correlated portfolio with a few engines to counterbalance the weaker components of the portfolio.

BACKGROUND & DETAILS

As described further in “The Truth About P/Es” in the Stock Market section at www.CrestmontResearch.com, P/E ratios can be based upon (a) trailing earnings or forecast earnings, (b) net earnings or operating earnings, and (c) reported earnings or business cycle-adjusted earnings.

(a) The historical average for the normalized P/E is 16.3 based upon reported ten-year trailing real earnings (i.e., the method popularized by Robert Shiller at Yale). The ultra-high P/Es of the late 1990s and early 2000s were high enough and lasted long enough to significantly distort what we now know to be the average P/E. If those years are excluded, the normalized P/E is almost one multiple point lower (i.e., approx.. 15.5). Further, if forecast earnings is used, the average normalized P/E would be reduced by approximately one multiple point to 14.5. Note that the average reported P/E from 1900 to 2011, unadjusted for the business cycle and adjusted for the late 1990s bubble, is 14.

(b) Substituting operating earnings for net earnings would further reduce the normalized average P/E by almost three points to 11.5.

(c) Although the effect of the business cycle is muted in longer-term averages, the currently-reported P/E varies significantly due to the business cycle (more later).

It is important to ensure relevant comparisons—that is, P/Es that are based upon trailing reported net earnings should only be compared to the historical average of 14. When ten years of real net earnings are used in P/E (i.e., Shiller P/E10), the relevant average is 15.5.

Too often, writers and analysts compare a P/E that is based upon forecast operating earnings to the average for trailing reported net earnings. Although long-term forward operating earnings data is not available, the appropriate P/E for that comparison would be closer to 11.

Yet the most significant distortion from quarter-to-quarter or year-to-year is due to the earnings cycle, or as some refer to it, the business cycle.

THE BUSINESS CYCLE

As described further in “Beyond The Horizon: Redux 2011”, “Back To The Horizon”, and “Beyond The Horizon” in the Stock Market section at www.CrestmontResearch.com (and in more detail in chapters 5 & 7 of Probable Outcomes: Secular Stock Market Insights), corporate earnings progresses through periods of expansion that generally last two to five years followed by contractions of one to two years. The result of these business cycles is that earnings revolves around a baseline relationship to the overall economy. Keep in mind that the business cycle is distinct from the economic cycle of expansions and recessions.

Figure 2. EPS: S&P 500 Companies (1950 to 2012E)

Click on graph for larger image.

For example, looking back over the past six decades, Figure 2 presents the annual change in earnings historically reported by the S&P 500 companies and forecasted by Standard & Poors. This graph highlights the surge and decline cycle of earnings growth that is driven by the business cycle.
When the reported amount of earnings is viewed on a graph, the result is a generally upward sloping cycle of earnings growth. Since earnings (“E”) grows in a relatively close relationship to economic growth (GDP) over time, there is a longer-term earnings baseline (as discussed in chapter 7 of Unexpected Returns) that reflects the business cycle-adjusted relationship of earnings to economic growth (GDP). Figure 3 presents actually reported E for the S&P 500 over the past four decades compared to the longer-term baseline.

Figure 3. EPS: Reported vs. Trend Baseline (1970 to 2013E)

Click on graph for larger image.

Why does this matter? Because if you only look at the P/E ratio reported for any quarter or year, the ratio (with such a volatile “E” as the denominator) will be quite distorted during peaks and troughs when compared to the more stable long-term average. About every five years or so, the reported P/E will reflect the opposite signal rather than a more rational view of P/E valuations. For example, the reported value for P/E in early 2003 reflected a fairly high value of 32 just as the S&P 500 Index had plunged to 800 (E had cycled to a trough of $25 per share). A P/E of 32 generally screams “sell” to most investment professionals; yet, in early 2003, that was a false signal! A more rational view using one of the business cycle-adjusted methods reflected a more modest 18. In a relatively low inflation and low interest rate environment, the scream should have been “Buy”…

Several years later, in 2006 (after an unusually-strong run in earnings growth), E peaked at $82 per share as the S&P 500 Index was hesitating at 1500. Most market pundits were recommending a strong “buy” due to a calculated P/E of only 17. Yet, using the rational business cycle-adjusted methodologies, the true message was “STOP”—P/Es were saying sell, with P/E more than 25.

Well the pundits were actually (sort of) right—P/Es did expand… Yet it was due to (what should have been expected) the normal down-cycle in E rather than the pundit-promoted increase in the stock market. So when investors’ stock market accounts were down almost 50%, they were handed explanations that the earnings decline was unexpected and the fault of the financial sector…

Many of the same pundits are bewildered by current market conditions and unsure about the future of E. Maybe this time will actually be different…or maybe not…

As for the market and P/E, it’s understandable that conservative investors and market spectators have watched the past few years with awe. Even so, the current momentum remains upward. Nonetheless, it is important to remain aware that typical market volatility makes it also likely that the market will experience significant short-term swings.

METHODS

To adjust for the variability of earnings across business cycles, a rational methodology is needed to reduce distortions and provide a normalized reading about the long-term level and trend in earnings. The most recognized methodology is the one popularized by Robert Shiller (Yale) in Irrational Exuberance and on his website. To smooth the ups and downs in earnings, his methodology creates an average of the reported earnings for the past ten years. To eliminate the effect of inflation, all earnings values are adjusted-forward and increased by the impact of inflation. The result is a ten-year average for E. Using the current stock market index value, we have a more rational view of the current P/E valuation of the stock market.

For historical values, whether it relates to a month or a year in the past, Shiller also adjusts the stock index value by averaging the closing price for each day during the period. The stock index adjustment reduces historical distortions caused by significant intra-period swings by the market.

Crestmont has developed a complementary methodology—one that is fundamentally-based—that produces similar results, yet also provides forward-looking insights. The approach is explained further in Chapter 7 of Unexpected Returns, yet in summary, it uses the close and fundamental (not coincidental) relationship between earnings per share (“E”) and gross domestic product (GDP) to adjust for the business cycles. The baseline E for each period essentially is based upon mid-point values for E across the business cycle—peak and trough periods of actual earnings reports are adjusted back to the underlying trend line to reduce the intra-cycle distortions.

Figure 4. P/E Ratio Methodologies: Crestmont vs. Shiller

Click on graph for larger image.

The historical relationship between Crestmont and Shiller is similar, as reflected in Figure 4, yet the Crestmont approach provides an estimate of the expected level of E based upon future economic growth (which has been fairly consistent over time). Also, by comparing reported E to baseline E, analysts and investors have a better understanding of the current position in the business cycle and magnitude of divergence above or below the long-term trend.

DISTANCE, NOT TIME

Secular bull markets can only occur when P/E ratios get low enough (due to high inflation or significant deflation) to then double or triple as inflation returns to a low level. As a result, secular market cycles are not driven by time, but rather they are dependent upon distance—as measured by the decline in P/E to a low enough level to then enable it to have a significant increase.

The table that follows in Figure 5 provides a representation of the ‘distance’ that would be required to reposition for a secular bull market. The scenario presents the typical historical starting point for secular bulls (i.e. P/Es below 10).

Note that this analysis does not include the dynamic of ‘time’. As we continue forward in time, the normalized level of earnings (“E”) will increase and naturally close the gap without the declines presented below.

This is not a prediction—maybe we can avoid a move to lower P/Es and keep this secular bear in hibernation. The result, after recovering from the recent cyclical bear market, would be approximately 6% total returns from the stock market including inflation; yet, it would avoid the devastatingly-low returns marked by full secular bear markets (see “Waiting For Average” at www.CrestmontResearch.com for a tally of the future expected return).

Nonetheless, since one of the most common questions is “when will this secular bear market end,” the table in Figure 5 seeks to answer that question and to highlight that secular market cycles are determined by ‘distance’ and not by ‘time’.

Figure 5. Distance To The Next Secular Bull?

Click on table for larger image.

POTENTIAL DISTANCE

As reflected in Figure 6, the current level of stock market valuation, as reflected in the P/E, provides the potential for relatively-attractive gains if financial markets stabilize, economic growth continues on average at historical growth rates, and inflation remains relatively low.

A P/E of 22.5 is used as a mid-range for P/Es in low inflation and low interest rate environments with historically average economic and earnings growth.

Figure 6. Stock Market Gain/Loss To Low Inflation P/E Levels

Click on table for larger image.

CONCLUSION

Today’s P/E is approximately 20.8; the stock market remains in secular bear market territory—close to the mid-range of fair value assuming a relatively low inflation and low interest rate environment. It is historically consistent for secular bear markets to present shorter-term periods of strong returns (cyclical bull markets) followed by periods of market declines (cyclical bear markets).

The only way to reposition into a secular bull market is to experience a decline in the stock market due to significant inflation or deflation. This can occur either by a significant decline over a short period of time (e.g. the early 1930s secular bear market) or by minimal decline over a longer period of time (e.g. the 1960s-1970s secular bear market).

This report assesses the current valuation level in the context of the longer-term market environment. The goal is to help investors and market spectators to assess more quickly the current conditions.

In this environment, as described in chapter 10 of Unexpected Returns, investors should take a more active “rowing” approach (i.e. diversified, actively managed investment portfolio) rather than the secular bull market “sailing” approach (i.e. passive, buy-and-hold investment portfolio over-weighted in stocks).

Author’s Note: For readers that are interested in the topics included in the report and elsewhere at CrestmontResearch.com, please note that the just-released book Probable Outcomes: Secular Stock Market Insights provides greater detail about normalizing EPS and P/E than was presented in Unexpected Returns. Probable Outcomes was written to answer two recently popular questions. First, is this secular bear market almost over? Second, what are the likely returns from the stock market over the decade of the 2010s? For more details, please visit www.ProbableOutcomes.com.

Note 2: Crestmont Research does not analyze the stock market or interest rates with a perspective about near-term direction or trends; Crestmont Research focuses on a longer-term, bigger picture view of market history and its fundamental drivers. Occasionally, the analysis indicates that a position has extended beyond the typical range of variation. In those times, the view can have relatively shorter-term implications. Also in those times, however, markets can take a path that is longer and farther than most investors expect before ultimately being restored toward the midrange position of balance of condition.

 

Related Articles

  • The Secular Bear Has Only Just Begun by Ed Easterling
  • Secular Cycles for Stocks by Ed Easterling
  • Consensus: A Groundhog Decade for Stocks by Ed Easterling
  • Bull or Bear? Let History Be the Guide by John Lounsbury (at Seeking Alpha)
  • Market Valuations and Longer Term Perspective by Doug Short and John Lounsbury


About the Author


Ed easterling Ed Easterling is the author of recently-released Probable Outcomes: Secular Stock Market Insights and award-winning Unexpected Returns: Understanding Secular Stock Market Cycles, contributing author to Just One Thing (John Wiley & Sons: 2005), and coauthor of chapters in Bull’s Eye Investing by John Mauldin (John Wiley & Sons: 2004). . Further, he is President of an investment management and research firm, and a Senior Fellow with the Alternative Investment Center at SMU’s Cox School of Business where he previously served on the adjunct faculty and taught the course on alternative investments and hedge funds for MBA students. Mr. Easterling publishes provocative research and graphical analyses on the financial markets at www.CrestmontResearch.com.

Previous Post

IMF: Less Austerity?

Next Post

Infographic of the Day: Making Internet Data Centers Green

Related Posts

Bitcoin Blasts Off to $34K Amid Soaring ETF Hype!
Economics

Bitcoin Blasts Off to $34K Amid Soaring ETF Hype!

by admin
10월 23, 2023
Crypto Enthusiasts Sound the Alarm as Bitcoin Surges to 3-Month High Just Shy of $31K
Economics

Crypto Enthusiasts Sound the Alarm as Bitcoin Surges to 3-Month High Just Shy of $31K

by admin
10월 23, 2023
Addresses With Over 1 Bitcoin Surge To New Highs: Investor Optimism Soars
Econ Intersect News

Addresses With Over 1 Bitcoin Surge To New Highs: Investor Optimism Soars

by admin
9월 29, 2023
Unlocking the Future: Google's Game-Changing Move to Advertise NFT Games Starting September 15th
Business

Unlocking the Future: Google’s Game-Changing Move to Advertise NFT Games Starting September 15th

by admin
9월 8, 2023
Bitcoin Is Finally Trading Perfectly Like 'Digital Gold'
Economics

Bitcoin Is Finally Trading Perfectly Like ‘Digital Gold’

by admin
8월 5, 2023
Next Post

Infographic of the Day: Making Internet Data Centers Green

답글 남기기 응답 취소

이메일 주소는 공개되지 않습니다. 필수 필드는 *로 표시됩니다

Browse by Category

  • Business
  • Econ Intersect News
  • Economics
  • Finance
  • Politics
  • Uncategorized

Browse by Tags

adoption altcoins bank banking banks Binance Bitcoin Bitcoin market blockchain BTC BTC price business China crypto crypto adoption cryptocurrency crypto exchange crypto market crypto regulation decentralized finance DeFi Elon Musk ETH Ethereum Europe Federal Reserve finance FTX inflation investment market analysis Metaverse NFT nonfungible tokens oil market price analysis recession regulation Russia stock market technology Tesla the UK the US Twitter

Archives

  • 2023년 10월
  • 2023년 9월
  • 2023년 8월
  • 2023년 7월
  • 2023년 6월
  • 2023년 5월
  • 2023년 4월
  • 2023년 3월
  • 2023년 2월
  • 2023년 1월
  • 2022년 12월
  • 2022년 11월
  • 2022년 10월
  • 2022년 9월
  • 2022년 8월
  • 2022년 7월
  • 2022년 6월
  • 2022년 5월
  • 2022년 4월
  • 2022년 3월
  • 2022년 2월
  • 2022년 1월
  • 2021년 12월
  • 2021년 11월
  • 2021년 10월
  • 2021년 9월
  • 2021년 8월
  • 2021년 7월
  • 2021년 6월
  • 2021년 5월
  • 2021년 4월
  • 2021년 3월
  • 2021년 2월
  • 2021년 1월
  • 2020년 12월
  • 2020년 11월
  • 2020년 10월
  • 2020년 9월
  • 2020년 8월
  • 2020년 7월
  • 2020년 6월
  • 2020년 5월
  • 2020년 4월
  • 2020년 3월
  • 2020년 2월
  • 2020년 1월
  • 2019년 12월
  • 2019년 11월
  • 2019년 10월
  • 2019년 9월
  • 2019년 8월
  • 2019년 7월
  • 2019년 6월
  • 2019년 5월
  • 2019년 4월
  • 2019년 3월
  • 2019년 2월
  • 2019년 1월
  • 2018년 12월
  • 2018년 11월
  • 2018년 10월
  • 2018년 9월
  • 2018년 8월
  • 2018년 7월
  • 2018년 6월
  • 2018년 5월
  • 2018년 4월
  • 2018년 3월
  • 2018년 2월
  • 2018년 1월
  • 2017년 12월
  • 2017년 11월
  • 2017년 10월
  • 2017년 9월
  • 2017년 8월
  • 2017년 7월
  • 2017년 6월
  • 2017년 5월
  • 2017년 4월
  • 2017년 3월
  • 2017년 2월
  • 2017년 1월
  • 2016년 12월
  • 2016년 11월
  • 2016년 10월
  • 2016년 9월
  • 2016년 8월
  • 2016년 7월
  • 2016년 6월
  • 2016년 5월
  • 2016년 4월
  • 2016년 3월
  • 2016년 2월
  • 2016년 1월
  • 2015년 12월
  • 2015년 11월
  • 2015년 10월
  • 2015년 9월
  • 2015년 8월
  • 2015년 7월
  • 2015년 6월
  • 2015년 5월
  • 2015년 4월
  • 2015년 3월
  • 2015년 2월
  • 2015년 1월
  • 2014년 12월
  • 2014년 11월
  • 2014년 10월
  • 2014년 9월
  • 2014년 8월
  • 2014년 7월
  • 2014년 6월
  • 2014년 5월
  • 2014년 4월
  • 2014년 3월
  • 2014년 2월
  • 2014년 1월
  • 2013년 12월
  • 2013년 11월
  • 2013년 10월
  • 2013년 9월
  • 2013년 8월
  • 2013년 7월
  • 2013년 6월
  • 2013년 5월
  • 2013년 4월
  • 2013년 3월
  • 2013년 2월
  • 2013년 1월
  • 2012년 12월
  • 2012년 11월
  • 2012년 10월
  • 2012년 9월
  • 2012년 8월
  • 2012년 7월
  • 2012년 6월
  • 2012년 5월
  • 2012년 4월
  • 2012년 3월
  • 2012년 2월
  • 2012년 1월
  • 2011년 12월
  • 2011년 11월
  • 2011년 10월
  • 2011년 9월
  • 2011년 8월
  • 2011년 7월
  • 2011년 6월
  • 2011년 5월
  • 2011년 4월
  • 2011년 3월
  • 2011년 2월
  • 2011년 1월
  • 2010년 12월
  • 2010년 8월
  • 2009년 8월

Categories

  • Business
  • Econ Intersect News
  • Economics
  • Finance
  • Politics
  • Uncategorized
토토사이트

After nearly 11 years of 24/7/365 operation, Global Economic Intersection co-founders Steven Hansen and John Lounsbury are retiring. The new owner, a global media company in London, is in the process of completing the set-up of Global Economic Intersection files in their system and publishing platform. The official website ownership transfer took place on 24 August.

Categories

  • Business
  • Econ Intersect News
  • Economics
  • Finance
  • Politics
  • Uncategorized

Recent Posts

  • Bitcoin Blasts Off to $34K Amid Soaring ETF Hype!
  • Crypto Enthusiasts Sound the Alarm as Bitcoin Surges to 3-Month High Just Shy of $31K
  • Addresses With Over 1 Bitcoin Surge To New Highs: Investor Optimism Soars

© Copyright 2021 EconIntersect - Economic news, analysis and opinion.

No Result
View All Result
  • Home
  • Contact Us
  • Bitcoin Robot
    • Bitcoin Profit
    • Bitcoin Code
    • Quantum AI
    • eKrona Cryptocurrency
    • Bitcoin Up
    • Bitcoin Prime
    • Yuan Pay Group
    • Immediate Profit
    • BitIQ
    • Bitcoin Loophole
    • Crypto Boom
    • Bitcoin Era
    • Bitcoin Treasure
    • Bitcoin Lucro
    • Bitcoin System
    • Oil Profit
    • The News Spy
    • British Bitcoin Profit
    • Bitcoin Trader
  • Bitcoin Reddit

© Copyright 2021 EconIntersect - Economic news, analysis and opinion.