French Defence Budget: Fewer Troops, Better Equipment
Written by Hilary Barnes
When the French government prepared a defence white paper in March, one of the kinder remarks was made by Jean-Sylvestre Mongrenier, Research Fellow at the Thomas More Institute, a Paris think tank, who said :
“This document announces another cut in France’s military ambitions, thus jeopardising its political status, its effective power and its contribution to Europe.”
The white paper contained two expenditure scenarios, of which one, supported by the Ministry of Finance, was dubbed by some defence experts as “Apocalypse now“.
It involved not only large cuts in defence manpower, but also abandoning sections of France’s substantial defence industrial capacity, such as production by the Dassault Aviation of the Rafale jet fighters on which the French air force relies.
However, the Minister of Defence, Jean-Yves Le Drian, backed by President Francois Hollande (whose views may have been influenced by his decision in January to send 4,000 French troops to Mali to halt Islamic insurgents from trying to take over this land-locked Saharan country) fought off the austerity hawks at the Finance Ministry.
In the minister’s presentation on August 2 of his final budget plan to the Council of Ministers, over which the president presides, the defence budget for the years 2013 to 2019 was put at €190bn in current price terms. This is about €179bn in constant price terms with the intention of spending €364bn over the period 2014 to 2025.
This represented stabilisation of the budget to 2019 and volume growth thereafter, said the white paper, although the volume increase is difficult to discern in the figures themselves.
This leaves the defence budget at around 1.5 % of GDP compared with 3 % when the cold war ended with the fall of the Berlin Wall and the 1 % to which the Finance Ministry would have liked to see it reduced.
There was much caustic comment from defence buffs on the efforts by the Finance Ministry to balance the budget by hitting defence expenditure, accounting for only about 3 % of France’s public sector expenditure, while social security expenditure, which accounts for 33 % of expenditure, was not in line for reductions.
Defence personnel will be cut over the period to 2019 by 34,000 compared with the 50,000 cut envisaged by the austerity alternative.
Given that from a total of 322,000 in 2008, the total strength has since been reduced by 54,000, the total reduction in personnel over a decade will come to over 80,000 or about a quarter of the 2008 strength. The defence minister declared:
“By the completion of the process the armed forces will have a strength of 242,000. France will retain its rank, France will keep its place.”
Mr Montgrenier commented in an August 2 article at the Thomas Moore Institute that France should in future have no difficulty in mounting operations of the size of the Mali expedition, always bearing in mind that even this required logistical assistance from the UK and surveillance and intelligence assistance from the USA, as will as combat troops from Chad, but “it would be on the ropes” for anything over 10,000 troops.
The white paper did not make any changes in France’s basic defence and security strategy, including it’s co-operation with NATO and the maintenance of France’s nuclear deterrent. But lay stress on certain points, including:
- The importance placed on the African continent
- The increasing importance of intelligence gathering and a new commitment to defence against cyber attack.
- A commitment to pooling scarce resources with its European allies where possible, such as air lift, in-flight refuelling, naval aviation capacity) as part of a “European dynamic of capitalising on alliances“.
- A redefinition of the defence doctrine between two main tasks, crisis management and coercive operations, with up to 7,000 troops available for the first and two brigades totalling 15,000 troops on permanent standby for the second.
- A commitment to conserving the defence industrial sectors that are the “technological base and instrument for for preserving France’s strategic autonomy and sovereignty” – a commitment which would not have survived the “Apocalypse now” scenario.
- An increase from about 1200 to 1500 in the special (commando type) forces such as those that spearheaded the Mali force to roust out the insurgents ensconced in the mountainous area of northern Mali.
The defence budget plan is widely seen as sacrificing personnel in the interests of improving the quality and sophistication of the defence effort. The August 2 statement said:
“An important effort is planned for renewal of equipment and two remedy deficiencies, including multi-role refuelling aircraft, Rafales jet fighters, armoured combat vehicles, helicopters, multi-mission frigates, nuclear attack submarines and cruise missiles.”
The French defence industry is said to employ about 260,000 persons directly and indirectly, with the largest number employed in the aircraft industry, including Dassault Aviation and EADS, the latter best known for the Airbus passenger aircraft, but with a substantial defence arm as well.
The total strength of the land forces under the new budget will about 60,000. Armaments will include 200 heavy tanks, 250 medium tanks, 2,700 armoured combat vehicles, 140 reconnaissance and attack helicopters, 115 tactical helicopters and 20 tactical drones.
The Air Force will have 225 fighters and 50 tactical transport aircraft, seven detection and surveillance aircraft, 12 multi-mode refuelling aircraft, plus light reconnaissance aircraft and eight medium-range missile systems.
The naval forces include four nuclear-powered, ballistic missile-carrying submarines, high-level combat capabilities for high-intensity operations and major crisis management missions, with an aircraft carrier, six nuclear-powered attack submarines, three combined support and command vessels and 15 front- line frigates. They will be supplemented by lighter units capable of controlling maritime spaces: 15 patrol boats, six surveillance frigates and support vessels, naval patrol aircraft and a mine-laying capability.
It is perhaps worth noting that Mr Mongrenier in his August 2 article did not repeat the censorious remark cited at the beginning of this article. His main criticism was to suggest excessive reliance on defence industrial autonomy should give way to increased off-the-shelf buying from abroad.
