by Guest Author ECB Watch
This is a companion to another article to be published Draghi Nomination Based on Deception. Here, we address the broader issue of the falsification of Greece’s public finance data. We will look into Eurostat audits (Walter Radermacher), the ECB’s willful hindrance against the release of records (Jean Claude Trichet), Goldman Sachs’ communication (Gerald Corrigan), and the actions of the European parliament (Sharon Bowles), the Commission (Olli Rehn) and the European Securities and Markets Authority (Verena Ross). Click on cartoon for larger image.
Eurostat ran a series of audits of Greece’s public finances from 2009 to 2010, including for the swap transactions contracted with Goldman Sachs in 2001. These were used to misrepresent, by a few % relative to GDP, the extent of debt and deficits. Eurostat says it only became aware of it in early 2010: this calls for an explanation because news of the contentious transactions broke in 2003. According to the final audit, in 2010, the window dressing scheme initiated in 2001 was significantly restructured in August 2005. Soon after, Goldman Sachs sold its position for cash to the National Bank of Greece. This 2005 modification of the 2001 contract resulted in a 81% increase in the amount of concealed debt, in the accounts of 2006, relative to the initial amount. According to the same audit, Greece willfully misled Eurostat in 2008, when the contracts were still in effect (in fact, they will be until 2037). The national accounts of Greece were regularized by Eurostat in November 2010.
Spokesman for the bank Gerald Corrigan testified before the British parliament in February 2010. He personally vouched that the letter of the law was obeyed in the 2001 deal, suggesting that it was EU’s fault for allowing a loophole in its regulations. To minimize the perception of wrongdoing he reminded the audience that similar practices were age-old and common in the industry. Yet he stonewalled the questions of whether specific countries, Portugal and the UK, respectively, were clients that fell under this category. His leaving out the 2005 restructuring in his testimonial is an odd oversight.
He [Gerald Corrigan] personally vouched that the letter of the law was obeyed in the 2001 deal, suggesting that it was EU’s fault for allowing a loophole in its regulations.
In April 2010, former prime minister of Belgium Guy Verhofstadt spearheaded a hearing, Greece : the moment of truth. It was held by the Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee of the EU Parliament under Sharon Bowles’ chairmanship. There appears to be a disconnect between the objective and what Sharon Bowles delivered, as we argue further down in relation to ESMA, but another indication of it is that the deposition of the spokesman for Goldman Sachs, Gerald Corrigan, bears no relation to the stated topic (the word
Greeceis not to be found). This is perhaps an indication of a disconnect between the objective and what Sharon Bowles delivered. We will argue it further below in relation to ESMA.
In November 2010, Jean Claude Trichet obstructed the release, requested by Bloomberg, of ECB documents detailing the swap transactions. In May 2011, he went as far as vetoing a legal claim, made by Bloomberg, to reopen these archives. Was his justification, preventing acute market risks, satisfactory?
In August 2011, the Commissioner for Economic and Monetary Affairs, Olli Rehn, to appease the concern of an MEP about the possible connection of Mario Draghi to the falsification of Greek public finance data, misrepresented the evidence contained in a November 2010 Eurostat audit report as to this connection. Recall that Mario Draghi’s hearing in June, just before a vote by the European parliament on his nomination, was, and remains to this day, controversial due to discrepancies between his defense on this issue and verified facts.
The legislative branch, in the U.S., has gone to great length to learn from the mistakes of the financial crisis. In addition it came with evidence based recommendations to pursue criminal investigations that were or have been carried out by federal agencies and the department of justice. In fairness, this process has been stymied by powerful interest groups. Even so, Europe’s response, in comparison, for the case studied here, which is a significant chapter of the Greek debt crisis, looks unfavorable. The hearing Greece : the hour of truth may well have been a pretense, as hinted at. We now argue it further. The Commission and the European parliament would have had the authority to commission ESMA to investigate the matter. Neither Olli Rehn nor Sharon Bowles, it seems, has taken this step. Had it been the case, ESMA would have had the authority, if the conclusion of the investigation called for it, to bring a legal case against any alleged perpetrator of fraud, or delegate that task to national authorities. Instead, ESMA’s stated priorities, under the leadership of its new Executive Director, Verena Ross, are
the single rule book, production and analysis of data, and supervising credit rating agencies…
Note : we now use the EU institutions’ convention that ECON stands for Economic and Monetary Affairs.
Eurostat is the statistical office the EU Commission, whose current Director General is Walter Radermacher. In Eurostat parlance, a
methodological visit is an audit that is
undertaken in cases where the Eurostat identifies substantial risks or potential problems with the quality of the data. There were a series of methodological visits to Greece. They began in 2009 and continued through 2010. Three major reports were produced, one on 29 October 2009, the second on 8 January 2010 and the third in November 2010. According to the last one, a
series of failings in the institutional arrangements and practical compilation of Greek public finance data. We skimmed through the January report and read the November 2010 report. Only the latter addresses the contentious Greek swaps transaction. It concluded as follows:
Taking into account the work carried out [i.e. corrections to misreported data], as described in this report, the latest debt and deficit data for Greece now gives, in Eurostat’s view, an essentially reliable picture, [including for] fiscal data for the years 2006-2009. It is, therefore, an important report as it represents Eurostat’s final opinion on the issue of the Greek swaps contracted with Goldman Sachs.
Greece patently misled it in 2008, claiming that it neither engaged in
FOREX swaps, nor in off market swaps.
Eurostat’s summary of its dealings with Greece as pertaining to these swaps would be hard to reconcile, prima facie, with the blithely reported claim that the transactions were legal. First, Eurostat says that
At the beginning of the year 2010, it became known that Greece had entered in 2001 into currency off-market swap agreements with Goldman Sachs, using an exchange rate different from the spot prevailing one.This is strange, however, because the scheme was reported in 2003 by Risk.net. Perhaps not coincidentally, notes the article, Greece’s credit rating by one of the three major credit rating agencies was raised, that year, from A to A+. Second, Eurostat says that Greece patently misled it in 2008, claiming that it neither engaged in
FOREX swaps, nor in off market swaps.These are exactly the type of transactions agreed between Greece and Goldman Sachs in 2001 and, as we see next, were actively managed thereafter.
Eurostat’s audit says that
in August 2005 a significant restructuring of the swap contract took place. The maturity of the swap was extended from 2019 to 2037. This, together with other modifications, resulted in an increase in the amount of undisclosed Greek debt data, for the portion that is imputable to the deal, from 2.830 bn euros in 2001  to 5.125 bn euros in 2006. It’s a 81% increase. Eurostat adds that
[a]lmost at the same time, GS sold its rights and obligations to the National Bank of Greece (NBG, a bank completely privatised in November 2004). As a side note, Mario Draghi was appointed head of Bank Italy in 2006, ending his employment at Goldman Sachs. The latter had begun in 2002, when Goldman Sachs was reportedly the lead manager of Greece’s debt underwriting. His denial of any connection to the deal in a hearing before the ECON Committee in June 2001 remains controversial to this day.
There is no question that the 81% increase in the debt hiding scheme, in 2006, is imputable to the August 2005 modification:
the restructuring operations implemented in 2005 and 2008 were in fact the explicit recognition of an increase of the liability (principal amount of the loan) to be recorded as debt of Greece.
To complete our coverage of the swap transactions, let us quote Eurostat:
[t]he swap was marginally restructured again in late 2008 [and was] securitised in February 2009 via a Special Purpose Vehicle (Titlos) that paid EUR 5.5 billion to the NBG.There is no question that the 81% increase in the debt hiding scheme, in 2006, is imputable to the August 2005 modification :
the restructuring operations implemented in 2005 and 2008 were in fact the explicit recognition of an increase of the liability (principal amount of the loan) to be recorded as debt of Greece.The corresponding amount, 5.125 bn euros, persisted until 2007. The 2008 modification pushed it to 5.4 bn euros, and 2009 saw a decrease to 5.281 bn euros. We think the decrease is the result of an amortization scheme kicking in after a
grace periodof two years mentioned in the report. In 2010, Eurostat assigned these amounts as additions to government debt for the years 2006—2009.
Goldman Sachs’ communication
Goldman Sachs Managing Director Gerald Corrigan testified before the House of Commons on February 22, 2010. This came to our attention in an article by Finfacts Ireland, and the transcript is contained in the document Too important too fail, too important to ignore (March 2010). In question 295, for short Q295, he is asked
[H]ave banks like Goldman’s not accentuated sovereign risk in countries like Greece by arranging loans for securitisation against future revenue streams that do not appear on the books or currency swaps that have not been calculated at normal exchange rates? To which, Corrigan personally vouches that the transactions were legal :
[It] is very clear to me, based on the investigation that I have done over the past few days, that those transactions were very much consistent and comparable with the standards of behaviour and measurement used by the European Community. There was nothing inappropriate. They were in conformity with existing rules and procedures when they were entered into. To back it up, he cites a consultation with Eurostat:
When those transactions were entered into personnel from Goldman Sachs consulted with the appropriate authorities at Eurostat, as did, as I understand it, the Government of Greece and, again, there was no indication whatsoever that those transactions were not in line with existing practices, policies and guidelines.
Goldman Sachs identified a flaw in EU rules, in 2001, and exploited it—opportunity. He [Corrigan] has not explicitly answered the question i.e. whether it increased sovereign risk —harm— but, absent his denial, it was implicitly conceded.
Finally, he shifts blame on the EU not having stringent enough rules:
I should also say that those guidelines and standards were modified in 2007 which suggests that perhaps they were more liberal than they should have been back in 2001.In other words, Goldman Sachs identified a flaw in EU rules, in 2001, and exploited it—opportunity. He has not explicitly answered the question i.e. whether it increased sovereign risk —harm— but, absent his denial, it was implicitly conceded. The rest of his answer is laced with the mitigating factors that these
practices have been around for decades, if not centuriesand
not limited to Goldman Sachs and Greece—rationalization. However, when asked to confirm whether a similar deal was contracted with Portugal (Q296) and Great Britain (Q297), he dodged and could not confirm, respectively, reiterating the above rationalization in each case.
The white elephant in the room, in this hearing, is the August 2005
significant restructuring of the swap contract.” That’s keeping in mind that Greece is alleged by Eurostat to have misled it in 2008 about the existence of such transactions. Although Goldman Sachs was no longer the counter party in 2008, it suggests that this modification has gone under the radar from August 2005 until Eurostat looked into the matter in 2010.
Let’s review some traits in Corrigan’s answers. He hinted at what we labeled an opportunity and had recourse to the same rationalization multiple times. These are two of the three factors that fall under the definition of the Fraud Triangle. This is merely superficial but, unfortunately, there is a significant legal precedent attesting of unethical business practices at this company: Goldman Sachs paid half a billion dollars to settle SEC charges that it misled investors in a subprime mortgage product (ABACUS) just as the U.S. housing market was starting to collapse. The third factor is a motive. The transaction generated hundreds of millions of dollars for the firm according to a press release by Bloomberg, EU seeks Greek swaps disclosure after ministry probe. The ratio of the upper estimate of the fees (200 millions euros) to the amount of Greek debt masked under the 2001 deal (2.830 bn euros) is 7.1%. The key deal maker, Antigone Loudiadis, made a substantial fortune from the deal in just one year, reported the Wall Street Journal in 2010, and enjoyed a career boost thereafter. Incidentally, she made controversial headlines again, reported Bloomberg in May 2011, as CEO of Rothesay Life, as regards to
He [Corrigan] hinted at what we labeled an opportunity and had recourse to the same rationalization multiple times. These are two of the three factors that fall under the definition of the Fraud Triangle.
Zero Hedge reported that, on the same day as Corrigan’s testimonial, the bank issued a communique. It essentially summarizes his arguments, with a few more figures but, again, makes no mention of the 2005 restructuring. Finally, Gerald Corrigan’s written statement does not address any of the above.
Obstruction by Jean Claude Trichet
First, Bloomberg filed a request with the ECB in November 2010 to have access to ECB internal documents detailing the contentious transactions. It was denied. Second, Bloomberg contested the decision at the EU’s General Court in Luxembourg in December 2010. Third, the ECB asked the General Court to dismiss the lawsuit, in May 2011, just one month before Mario Draghi’s nomination, apparently using a veto prerogative. That’s one month before the nomination of the next ECB President whose possible role in the falsification of Greek debt as Goldman Sachs VP from 2002 to 2005 was raised by Simon Johnson as early as February 2010. Fourth, Bloomberg reacted in June 2011 with these words :
The European Central Bank allowed itself to be deceived by a default in the making and now refuses to share with the taxpaying citizens it represents the details of the deception. Secret and opaque financing got Europe into a mess that can only be resolved by the transparency of full disclosure.
The European parliament
As a member of the UK’s Liberal Democratic Party, Sharon Bowles is also affiliated with the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats of Europe, in short ALDE. In March 2010, the former prime minister of Belgium and group leader of ALDE, Guy Verhofstadt, made a proposal to
to promptly convene a public hearing of all those implicated in the falsification of Greek public accounts. He followed up with a declaration on 14 April 2010, reported in a press release known as Greece: the moment of truth, for Sharon Bowles to ask
Director General of Eurostat to explain how accounts could have been legally modified and what measures were taken in the aftermath to prevent such actions. This was supposed to be discussed in a hearing, the same day, titled The fiscal crisis in the European Union – lessons from Greece. According to the ECON Committee’s
final draft programme, its participants were Sharon Bowles (moderator), Olli Rehn, Walter Radermacher, Gerald Corrigan, and a representative from a financial derivatives organization (ISDA), Richard Metcalfe. We did not find the transcript of the hearing at EU Parliament’s portal, which is unfortunate, but we did find the deposition of Gerald Corrigan. It contains
insights on two subjects and nothing more. The first is
perspective on government debt management, such as the benefits of issuing debt through primary dealers. The second is
facilitating derivatives market surveillance, which recounts the initiatives of the financial industry policy group chaired by Corrigan, the Counterparty Risk Managment Policy Group (CRMPG). This hardly addresses Guy Verhofstadt’s injunction, quoted in the press release Greece: the moment of truth :
The chairman of Goldman Sachs in the US in particular should justify his bank’s speculation against Greek sovereign debt and the motivation of the investment bank which did not seem to be entirely based on economic considerations.
“widespread misreporting of deficit and debt data by the Greek authorities during in November 2004, […] and on five occasions between 2005 and 2009.” Eurostat audit January 2010
The topic reemerged in a parliamentary debate about Quality of statistical data in the Union and enhanced auditing powers by the Commission, on 15 June 2010. To frame it, we suppose, Sharon Bowles posted on 4 June 2010 the question of “whether any [Member States] have submitted falsifications or false data or statistics either intentionally or by neglect?” The January 2010 audit had already answered that question for Greece:
widespread misreporting of deficit and debt data by the Greek authorities during in November 2004, […] and on five occasions between 2005 and 2009.”“In short, there is circumstantial evidence that the chair of the ECON Committee, Sharon Bowles, around 2010, was lagging behind Eurostat’s methodological visits to Greece.
To conclude this section, former PM of Belgium Guy Verhofstadt’s high hopes, Greece : the moment of truth, in April 2010, may have fallen flat; that is, the EU parliament failed to deliver an account of
who did what?
In ECON Commissioner Olli Rehn‘s words spoken during the aforementioned 15 June 2010 debate, the closest match to Sharon Bowles’ question was
As is well known, the Commission has undertaken in-depth work on Greek statistics over several years. The amended regulation should, in future, better mitigate the risk of fraud or manipulation of statistics, or of any other kind of irregularity. Yesterday, there was a new development concerning Greece. You will know that Moody’s decided to downgrade Greek bonds yesterday. On 21 July 2011, a parliamentary question was addressed to him, on the subject of Appointment of Mario Draghi as President of the European Central Bank. This question was :
Does the Commission have information on Mario Draghi’s involvement, whilst he was Goldman Sachs’ European vice-chair, in the dealings between the bank and the Greek Government over the concealment of accountancy fiddles? Olli Rehn’s answer, on 22 August 2011, was that
transactions in derivatives between the Greek debt agency and Goldman Sachs dated back to 2001, implying that the President of the ECB had no connection to them. This is one of the two arguments presented by Mario Draghi before the ECON Committee in June, just before the vote on his nomination, that were found to be unsatisfactory. Olli Rehn backs up his claim by citing the November 2010 Eurostat audit. This is perplexing because the audit reveals that the terms of the contract between Goldman Sachs and the Greek Ministry of Finance were modified in August 2005. This modification resulted in an 81% increase in the amount of debt concealed through this type of scheme. Presumably, Mario Draghi still worked at Goldman Sachs at the time, since his term of office at the Central Bank of Italy started in January 2006.
In short, in August 2011, the Commissioner for ECON either misled the MEP (Willy Meyer) having some concern about Mario Draghi’s past at Goldman Sachs, or had superficial knowledge of the Eurostat audit he cited as evidence in defense of Mario Draghi’s reputation.
Has justice run its normal course?
Let’s try to understand by looking at a comparable case, the United States, where the financial lobby is nonetheless powerful. The above mentioned settlement with the SEC in July 2011 marked the end of a civil lawsuit that had begun in April 2010. On 30 April 2011, Reuters reported that federal prosecutors in New York had begun a criminal investigation into other transactions, upon referral by the SEC. In parallel, the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, for short PSI, was investigating the financial crisis. It’s outcome, a bipartisan report, known as the Levin-Coburn report, was released in April 2011. According to the Wall Street Journal, it asked for bank regulators to
examine mortgage-related securities to identify any possible legal violations and use Goldman Sachs as a case study in implementing conflict prohibitions. October 2011, the aforementioned federal investigation, in New York, reportedly materialized with $1bn lawsuit against the bank, using evidence of investment bank abuses from the Levin-Coburn Report:
Timberwolf was cited in a scathing U.S. Senate panel report in April that faulted Goldman, Deutsche Bank AG and others for hawking debt they expected to perform poorly..
Is the system of government fundamentally different in Europe, in this respect? Of course not. The equivalent of the SEC, in the EU, is the European Securities Markets Authority, for short ESMA, formerly the CESR. It has only recently been granted enforcement authority known as level 4 of its governing procedure. Yet, it can
issue a recommendation to a national authority[to carry out legal action]. To do so, ESMA must first carry out an investigation. According to the same provision (level 4), the European parliament (Sharon Bowles), or the Commission (Olli Rehn) can request ESMA to get it under way.
The falsification of Greek debt, based on what was said thus far, and the fact that Goldman Sachs did not disclose it (See February 2010 Bloomberg article), presumably constitutes a fairly obvious breach of their fiduciary duty as a primary dealer—a privileged position in the market. Is anyone aware of Sharon Bowles or Olli Rehn launching an investigation into this scheme? Let’s try to find out.
But in view of what precedes, there is reason to suspect that authorities have turned a blind eye to the problem. [referring to the falsification of Greek debt]
In October 2011, a new Executive Director of ESMA, Verena Ross, was nominated, with the ECON Committee’s approval. She gave a keynote speech to that effect in October 2011, in which she laid out her vision of the
future focus of the work [of ESMA].A lot has to do with harmonizing rules and processes across member states . None of it addresses the glaring priority of bringing to justice the suspected perpetrators of financial crime. If Verena Ross’ speech is to be taken at its word, the
future focusof ESMA has a negative connotation: turn the page and pretend that financial crime never happened. In fairness, there were reports of a possible probe into this bank’s activities by the UK’s FSA and Bafin in Germany in the first half of 2010, but nothing specific about the falsification of Greek debt that we are aware of. There was, however, a specific reference to that effect, in the US, by Fed Chairman Bernanke in the same period. We can’t be certain that these investigations have stalled, or were put to rest. But in view of what precedes, there is reason to suspect that authorities have turned a blind eye to the problem.
Some financial experts allege a broader cynical scheme undertaken by the bank, that is reminiscent of its practices in the subprime crisis. Essentially, these are hedging and speculative bets using insider knowledge of Greek public finances. Let’s briefly review the literature. In February 2010, two authors, Marshal Auerback and L. Randall Wray alleged that
From 2001 through November 2009 […] not only did Goldman and other financial firms help and encourage Greece to take on more debt, they also brokered credit default swaps on Greece’s debt—making income on bets that Greece would default. No doubt they also took positions as the financial conditions deteriorated—betting on default and driving up CDS spreads. Corroborating evidence and analysis can be found in the following articles, listed in in chronological order : What about Greece and Goldman Sachs (Diplomatic World, Spring 2010), Clearing the air: Goldman Sachs and Greece (Hellenesonline, January 2011) and Goldman bet against entire European nations —who were clients— the same way it bet against its subprime mortgage clients (Washington’s blog, July 2011).
 The masking scheme is the combination of two sets of swaps. In the first set, a currency swap neutralizes Greece’s currency risk resulting from preexisting foreign denominated debt:
In 2001 a series of off-market cross-currency swaps were effectively linked to underlying debt instruments issued on foreign markets. This would have been standard practice, except for this clause:
the contracts were not based on the prevailing spot market rates of exchange [such that] the Greek government debt was de facto [immediately] reduced by EUR 2.4 billion by the conversion process. The second contains off-market interest swaps that are equivalent to a promise by Greece to make a stream of payments to Goldman Sachs. This second set was designed to offset the gain for Greece resulting from the first set, such that its impact on debt and deficit, we must assume, would be gradual and slow.
 The first pertains to the Single rule book i.e. harmonization of
guidelines and recommendations across EU member states. The second,
linked to the first, deals with another aspect of legislative harmonization. The third, pertains to
analyzing financial market trends and identify risks to protect investors, with
also – as the ultimate stick, the power to
ban some products and activity if necessary. The fourth is the supervision of Credit Rating Agencies (CRA), and the fifth if to promote financial stability by
actively contribut[ing] data and analysis
* Revealed : Goldman Sachs’ megal-deal for Greece, Risk.net, 1 July 2003
* Methodological visit report on Greek government statistics and debt statistics, Eurostat, 8 January 2010
* Statement by E. Gerald Corrigan before the U.K. Treasury Select Committee, Goldman Sachs, February 2010
* Goldman Sachs, Greece didn’t disclose swap contracts, Bloomberg, 17 February 2010
* The woman behind Greece’s debt deal, Wall Street Journal, 22 February, 2010
* Goldman issues press release on Greek swaps, pours more gas on PR Fire, Zero Hedge, 22 February 2010
* Marshal Auerback and L. Randall Wray, Memo to Greece: make war, not love, with Goldman Sachs, Naked Capitalism, 22 February 2010
* Goldman Sachs banker says Greek greek hiding scheme could have and should have been more transparent, Finfacts Ireland, 23 February 2010
* EU seeks Greek swaps disclosure after ministry probe, Bloomberg, 25 February 2010
* Falsification of Greek public accounts : hearing at the EU parliament (press release), Alliance for Liberals and Democrats of Europe, 4 Mars 2010
* Too important too fail—too important to ignore, Ninth report of session 2009-10, Volume II, House of Commons Treasury Committee, 22 March 2010
* Fiscal crisis in the European Union – Lessons from Greece: economic surveillance, statistics, off-balance sheet operations and sovereign debt (final draft programme), ECON Committee, 13 April 2010
* Greece: the hour of truth (Press release), Alliance for Liberals and Democrats of Europe, 14 April 2010
* Statement by E. Gerald Corrigan before European Parliament Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs, Brussels, Belgium, 14 April 2010
* U.S. starts criminal probe into Goldman : source, Reuters, 30 April 2010
* What about Greece and Goldman Sachs?, Diplomatic World Nº26, Spring 2010
* Quality of statistical data in the Union, and enhanced auditing powers of the commission (Parliamentary questions), 4 June 2010
* Quality of statistical data in the Union, and enhanced auditing powers of the commission (Debate), European Parliament, 15 June 2010
* Goldman Sachs to pay record $550 millions to settle SEC charges related to subprime mortgage CDO (Press release), SEC, 15 July 2010.
* Report on the EDP methodological visit to Greece in 2010, Eurostat, November 2010
* ECB rejects request for files on Greek derivatives cites acute risks, Bloomberg, 5 November 2010
* Bloomberg sues ECB to force disclosure of Greek swaps, Bloomberg, 22 December 2010
* Clearing the air: Goldman Sachs and Greece, Hellenesonline, 3 January 2011
* Senate report lays bare mortgage mess, Wall Street Journal, 14 April 2011
* Britain, Germany, weigh action against Goldman Sachs, Business Standard, 29 April 2011
* ECB asks court to block Greek swap disclosure, cites market risk , Bloomberg, 13 May 2011
* Death derivatives emerge from pension risks of living too long, Bloomberg, 16 May 2011
* Release the ECB’s Greek files, Bloomberg, 17 June 2011
* Goldman bet against entire European nations —who were clients— the same way it bet against its subprime mortgage clients, Washington’s Blog, 16 July 2011
* Appointment of Mario Draghi as President of the European Central Bank – Question for written answer to the Commission Rule 117 (Parliamentary questions), European Parliament, 21 July 2011
* Appointment of Mario Draghi as President of the European Central Bank – Answer on behalf of the Commission (Parliamentary questions), European Parliament, 22 August 2011
* Keynote speech by Verena Ross, Executive Director of ESMA, at the City of London Brussels Annual Reception, ESMA, 11 October 2011
* Goldman sued for $1.07bn over Timberwolf CDO, Reuters, 28 October 2011
* Deceptive tactics were used to thrust ahead the nomination of the new ECB President, ECB Watch, 1 December 2011
* Bernanke says Fed reviewing Goldman Sachs-Greece contracts, Bloomberg, 26 February 2010
Draghi Nomination Based on Deception by ECB Watch
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A.I.G. and Greece: Comparing Bankruptcies by Elliott Morss
What Should Greece Do? by Elliott Morss
The Greek Revolt: Good News For Europe by Charles Wyposz
EU: Treating Symptoms, Ignoring Disease by Dirk Ehnts